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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-4202
___________
ZHEN BIU LIN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
___________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A75-011-436)
Immigration Judge: Charles Honeyman
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 16, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 16, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Zhen Biu Lin, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a final
order of removal. He fears that he will be subject to forced sterilization should he be
removed to China because he is the father of two children in the United States. For the

reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
decision rejecting Lin’s claim is supported by substantial evidence. As a result, we will
deny Lin’s petition for review.
I.
Lin and his future wife, Xiu Lin, illegally entered the United States in December
1997, and they were served with Notices to Appear upon arrival. Removal proceedings
for Lin were initiated in Chicago, then transferred to New York, and from there
transferred to Philadelphia in late 2002. During that five-year period, Lin and Xiu Lin
married; they had a son in November 2001. A daughter followed in April 2005. To block
his removal, Lin sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”).1 Lin did not claim that he had experienced past persecution.
Instead, Lin claimed that his fathering two children abroad violates China’s coercive
family planning policy, and that as such he will be targeted for sterilization upon removal
to his native Fujian Province.
At a hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Lin testified that alternative
sanctions for violating the family planning policy, such as fines or an IUD insertion for
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Lin’s wife separately applied for asylum in New York. A final order of removal was
entered against her in September 2002, and her petition for review was denied. See Lin v.
Gonzales, 148 F. App’x 38, 39 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2005) (fleeing village to avoid arranged
marriage not persecution “on account of” protected ground). The BIA denied Xiu Lin’s
motion to reopen, which was based on the same claim that Lin now raises in his petition
for review.
2

Xiu Lin, were inconceivable. After reviewing BIA precedent and the “voluminous
exhibits” in the record, the IJ determined that Lin had failed to satisfy any standard for
immigration relief. However, believing Lin’s case to be complex and the evidence
presented to have relative strength, the IJ certified Lin’s case to the BIA for further
review pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(c) and 1240.1(a)(1).2
The BIA cited three of its precedential decisions from 2007 for the proposition that
it had previously “found no pattern or practice of persecution by the Chinese government
against applicants on account of the birth of children in the United States.” The BIA
pointed to two of Lin’s exhibits, articles from CNN and World Journal, as evidence that
enforcement of the family planning policy is inconsistent and unlikely given Lin’s
particular situation. In addition, the BIA found that “the documents submitted by the
respondent regarding China’s population control law are general in nature and cumulative
of documentation analyzed in [the 2007] published decisions.” The BIA thus concluded
that there was “no reversible error in the [IJ’s] denial of asylum and withholding of
removal.” The BIA also concluded that the IJ did not err in denying Lin’s application for
CAT relief. Lin appealed.
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Because 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1) does not specifically provide for certification to the
BIA, we believe that the IJ meant to certify Lin’s case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
1240.1(a)(2). That provision allows for certification to the BIA when a case “involves an
unusually complex or novel question of law or fact.”
3

II.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1). See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2001). Where the BIA
defers to the IJ’s reasoning in part, as it did here, we review the BIA’s decision but
consider the IJ’s as well. See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 (3d Cir.
2003). We review both decisions for substantial evidence, see Briseno-Flores v. Att’y
Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007), upholding them “unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
see also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, and applicant must establish that
he has a well-founded fear that he will be persecuted if removed to his home country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b), and 1231(b)(3). That well-founded fear
consists of both a subjectively genuine fear of persecution and an objectively reasonable
possibility of persecution. See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003). To
qualify for CAT relief, an applicant must demonstrate “that it is ‘more likely than not’
that he or she will be tortured . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Pierre v.
Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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III.
An alien with a well-founded fear that he will be forced to undergo involuntary
sterilization is “deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(B). Furthermore, an alien with two or more children
born in China, or abroad, may qualify as a refugee if the evidence presented establishes
both that the births violate local family planning policies, and that local enforcement of
the policies is done through acts amounting to persecution. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 247, 251 (BIA 2007); Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196, 197-98 (BIA 2007).
Even assuming that Lin has a subjective fear of persecution based on China’s
coercive family planning policy, the evidence of record does not demonstrate that this
fear is objectively reasonable. See Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 469. That evidence shows, at
most, that children of Chinese nationals born abroad may be “counted” for purposes of
the family planning policy, (A.R. 265-66, 269-70, 277-78), and that involuntary
sterilizations and forced abortions have been used in the past as policy enforcement
measures against Chinese nationals who have had, or who attempted to have, children in
China. (A.R. 334-35, 366-370, 403-406, 418, 444-45, 450-51, 453-54, 469-73, 530, 545,
586.) However, there is not one exhibit that directly supports Lin’s claim: that a father of
two foreign-born children would be forcibly sterilized upon removal to Fujian Province,
specifically, or even China, generally. Therefore, we find no error in the BIA’s
determination that Lin lacks a well-founded fear of persecution, and that he is unlikely to
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be tortured upon removal to China.
Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, and we will deny Lin’s petition for review.3

3

Contrary to Lin’s assertion, this is not a case where the BIA has “fail[ed] to discuss
most of the evidentiary record.” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2008).
The BIA explicitly discussed a sufficient amount of relevant, non-cumulative
documentary evidence that post-dated its 2007 precedential decisions. We do agree with
Lin, though, that the BIA erred to the extent it believed that success on his claims
required a demonstration that involuntary sterilizations are mandated in Fujian Province.
See Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 111 (3d Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by
Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, any error is
harmless based on our ultimate conclusion in this opinion.
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